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The Criminalization of the Theft of Trade Secrets: 
An Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act
Nicola Searle*
Introduction
One of the most famous trade secrets in the world, the secret Coca-Cola formula, has 
long been a subject of fascination. Tales of this century-long, highly maintained secret 
have become part of the company’s folklore.1 However, Coca-Cola’s secrecy was 
tested in 2006 when Joya Williams and her two partners attempted to sell Coke secrets 
to its main rival, Pepsi, for $1.5 million.2 Pepsi turned these unmasked offenders over 
to the authorities and Williams was subsequently sentenced to eight years in prison.3 
The law that led to Williams’s incarceration is the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 
(EEA). Amid concerns over the vulnerability of American trade secrets, the United 
States enacted the EEA in 1996. Prior to the EEA, the theft of trade secrets was, by 
itself, not a crime. Using data from EEA prosecutions, this essay provides institutional 
detail and policy analysis of the EEA. It begins with a short history of the legislation, 
presents the theoretical underpinnings for trade secrecy protection progresses to a 
statistical analysis of the composition of EEA cases and concludes with a statistical 
and theoretical examination of the criminalization of trade secrets. 
This essay presents a law and economics assessment of how the elevation of the 
theft of trade secrets from civil malfeasance to a felony affects the incentives for 
both firms and potential thieves. The essay begins with a theoretical analysis of the 
EEA and concludes with an empirical assessment of prosecutions under the EEA. In 
comparison to penalties used in civil cases, the new incentive of a criminal deterrent 
to trade secret theft introduces severe consequences, such as incarceration as a form 
*Nicola Searle is Senior Knowledge Exchange Associate at the University of Abertay Dundee. B.S. 
(International Economics, 2000) Georgetown University; and MSc (International Strategy and Economics, 
2006) and PhD (Economics, 2010) University of St Andrews.
1.  For a discussion on the Coke folklore, see Barbara Mikkelson, Have a Cloak and a Smile, SNOPES.COM, 
http://www.snopes.com/cokelore/formula.asp (last updated June 4, 2011).
2.  3 Arrested in Coca-Cola Trade Secret Scheme, CNN.COM (July 5, 2006), http://money.cnn.com/2006/07/05/
news/companies/coke_pepsi/.
3.  United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2008).
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of punishment.4 Additionally, the criminalization of trade secrets plays into the property 
versus liability debate.5 When confronted with a theft of trade secrets, a  rm must decide 
whether to seek legal recourse and, if so, whether recourse should be criminal and/or civil.6 
However, the  nancial damages assessed in EEA criminal cases can be compared to civil 
cases, and are found to be lower.7  
The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of 1996
Amid reports of the theft8 of American trade secrets by foreigners, the United States 
enacted the EEA9 in 1996. The act marked a signi cant change in the legal approach to 
trade secrets by increasing the category of the theft of trade secrets to a felony, broadening 
the de nition of trade secrets and including extraterritorial jurisdiction. While most 
American states had passed the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA),10 the EEA harmonized 
trade secret law across the country. This new harmonization makes it possible to examine 
trade secrets thoroughly in a consistent manner across all states. 
The EEA was enacted under the presidency of Bill Clinton and coincided with a time of 
economic prosperity in the United States. It was, as Carr and Gorman note,11 drafted in 
a post-Cold War era during which time the United States enjoyed a relatively militarily 
peaceful time. Given these circumstances, many authors12 argue the closing down of the 
market for political and military spies meant these spies adapted their trade to industrial 
espionage. The concept that former spies were now engaging in economic espionage 
was of great interest to U.S. politicians and businesses.13 According to Fialka, a series of 
incidents involving French businessmen and spy allegations in the early 1990s caught the 
attention of the U.S. intelligence agencies.14 Acquisitions of American assets by Chinese 
and Japanese entities alarmed American businesses.15 At the same time, the economy was 
in the process of shifting to an ever more information based, digital platform which both 
increased the bulk of potentially valuable information and exposed that information to the 
4.  Chris Carr, Jack Morton & Jerry Furniss, The Economic Espionage Act: Bear Trap or Mouse Trap?, 8 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159 (2000).
5.  See infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
6.  KEITH HODKINSON & MARTIN WASIK, INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE PROTECTION AND REMEDIES (1986).
7.  Josh Lerner, Using Litigation to Understand Trade Secrets: A Preliminary Exploration (Aug. 2006), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=922520.
8.  See JOHN J. FIALKA, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA (1997).
9.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2006).
10.  Robbin J. Effron, Note, Secrets and Spies: Extraterritorial Applications of the Economic Espionage Act 
and the TRIPS Agreement, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1485 (2003).
11.  Chris Carr & Larry Gorman, The Revictimization of Companies by the Stock Market Who Report Trade 
Secret Theft Under the Economic Espionage Act, 57 BUS. LAW. 25, 25-33 (2001).
12.  Carr et al., supra note 4; Carr & Gorman, supra note 11; HEDEIH NASHERI, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND 
INDUSTRIAL SPYING (2005).
13.  FIALKA, supra note 8; Effron, supra note 10.
14.  FIALKA, supra note 8, at 87-112.
15.  Id. at 41-65.
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inherent insecurity (e.g., its easily replicable nature) of the digital world.16 These political 
and economic shifts drew to public attention the potential threat of economic espionage and 
the vulnerability of trade secrets to theft.
Prior to the EEA, the theft of trade secrets was dealt with primarily via civil actions 
and related criminal charges.17 In two provisions, sections 1831 and 1832, the EEA 
elevated economic espionage and the theft of trade secrets to a felony. Section 1831, 
Economic Espionage, makes the theft of trade secrets to bene t a foreign agent a criminal 
act punishable by up to 15 years imprisonment and $500,000 for individuals and up to 
$10 million  ne for corporations. Section 1832, Theft of Trade Secrets, makes theft of, 
attempted theft of, or conspiracy to steal trade secrets a crime. In this case, the individual 
can be  ned up to $250,000 and imprisoned for up to 10 years, while corporations are 
subject to  nes up to $5 million. 
Two elements of the act have been controversial: the extension of the de nition of trade 
secrets and the potential extraterritorial application of the act. Effron (2003) notes the 
EEA’s broader de nition of trade secrets in comparison to the previous UTSA standard:
To the UTSA’s “formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, 
technique, or process,” the EEA adds “plans, . . . program devices, . . . designs, 
prototypes, . . . techniques, . . . procedures, . . . or codes” and expressly protects 
“ nancial, business, scienti c, technical, economic, or engineering information.18 
This extension to named types of information broadens the overall de nition of trade 
secrets. In addition, the concept of “public” as a test for secrecy is somewhat obfuscated in 
the EEA, which merely states, “from not being generally known to  . . . the public”,19 which 
leaves considerable room for interpretation of who the public entails. This has been a point 
of debate in EEA cases.20
In addition, the act has extraterritorial applications in Section 1837, Applicability to Conduct 
Outside the United States, which extends the prosecution of economic espionage and the theft 
of trade secrets to speci c conduct occurring outside the United States. This extraterritorial 
reach21 may force companies with U.S. links to enact protection schemes for the trade secrets, 
or alter their behavior in ways that they would have done prior to the EEA.22 At least one 
16.  Carr & Gorman, supra note 11.
17.  Id.
18.  Effron, supra note 10, at 1487.
19.  18 U.S.C. §1839(3)(B).
20.  For an example, see the appeal documents in United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 2002).
21.  To mitigate the controversy regarding the extraterritorial reach, the Attorney General (Janet Reno at the 
time) required the  rst  ve years of prosecutions be subject to express approval of the of ce of the attorney 
general. Craig L. Uhrich, The Economic Espionage Act—Reverse Engineering and Intellectual Property 
Public Policy, 7 MICH TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 147 (2001). 
22.  See Effron, supra note 10.
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case has involved conduct outside the United States. In United States v. Cartwright,23 two 
of the individual defendants were U.S. citizens living abroad in Prague and receiving stolen 
information to bene t two foreign corporations from their U.S.-based counterpart in Maryland. 
However, in cases involving foreign nationals, other countries may not be willing to extradite 
suspects.24 This was the case with United States v. Okamoto25 in which Japan refused the 
U.S. extradition request.26 These two cases are the only two EEA prosecutions that appear to 
involve the extraterritorial application and the question of extradition. 
  Justi cations for Trade Secrecy
The theoretical underpinnings of Intellectual Property Rights develop rationales for the 
creation of these property rights. Two prominent theories can be found in the writings of 
John Locke (1690) and Adam Smith (1776).27 Locke provides a theoretical justi cation for 
property rights applying the concept of labor theory of acquisition.28, 29 Locke argues that 
individuals have ownership of their own labor and, when that labor is applied to remove 
something out of its natural state, the result is also his property. Smith argues for property 
rights as a means to avoid the tragedy of the commons.30 IP protection systems provide 
a policy tool to maintain the delicate balance of the individual’s property rights and the 
utilitarian perspective of social surplus. 
Further justi cations can be found in the social contract theory of IP in which law 
is a contract between the state (society) and innovators. As Denicolo and Franzoni 
note, contract theory argues the goal of IP is to “promote the diffusion of innovative 
knowledge.”31 Under the patent system, the individual reveals the innovation and is granted 
protection from appropriation, in the form of a temporary monopoly, which then results 
23.  United States v. Cartwright, No. 1:07-cr-00570-WMN (D. Md.,  led Jan. 7, 2008), indictment available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f229900/229954.pdf.
24.  NASHERI, supra note 12.
25.  United States v. Okamoto, No. 1:01-cr-00210-DDD-1 (N.D. Ohio,  led May 8, 2001); Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, First Foreign Economic Espionage Indictment; Defendants Steal Trade Secrets 
from Cleveland Clinic Foundation (May 8, 2001), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/Okamoto_
SerizawaIndict.htm.
26.  Natalie Obiko Pearson, March 29, 2004, Tokyo Rejects Extradition of Alleged Spy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
March 29, 2004, available at http://www.economicespionage.com/tokyo_rejects_extradition_of_all.htm. 
27.  JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed. 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS (Andrew Skinner ed., Penguin Classics 1999) (1776). 
28.  Gary Becker labels Locke’s theory as “labor theory of acquisition.” Gary S. Becker, The Economics 
of Crime, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). Other authors refer to Locke’s theory as labor-deserve theory, e.g., 
Maurizio Borghi, Owning Form, Sharing Content: Natural-Right Copyright and Digital Environment, in 5 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 197 (Fiona McMillan ed., 2007), or merely labor theory.
29.  Texts and notes selected by Maurizio Borghi, Rationales for Patent Protection, Bocconi Intellectual 
Property Transatlantic Summer Academy, June 25, 2007.
30.  SMITH, supra note 27.
31.  Vincenzo Denicolò & Luigi A. Franzoni, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 365, 365 (2004).
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in higher prices and lower quantities of the good. In return, society bene ts from the 
innovation and receives the innovative knowledge in exchange for paying higher prices.
The justi cation for Trade Secret protection is more problematic than that of patents 
and copyrights. From the Lockean perspective, trade secrecy is compatible with labor 
theory of acquisition. Robert Bone, however, notes while the Lockean deserve-deserve 
theory does allow for some rights over the fruits of labor, it says nothing about the need for 
secrecy.32 Furthermore, from the utilitarian perspective, trade secrecy does not necessarily 
have the social surplus aspects required. As Edwin Hettinger notes, trade secrecy does not 
encourage the free  ow of information and can limit the labor mobility of employees.33 
These dif culties in justifying trade secrets highlight some of the doubts raised by legal 
scholars with respect to trade secrets as a form of IP.34
However, from a practical perspective, these arguments are partially addressed by 
the relatively low level of protection afforded to trade secrecy in comparison with other 
intellectual property.35 In addition, like patents, trade secrecy offers incentives to innovate 
and develop ideas. In response to Hettinger’s arguments, Lynn Paine argues trade secrecy 
is justi ed on the basis that individuals should have the right to control initial disclosure of 
their ideas, respect for con dential relationships and that patents, by offering incentives to 
disclose, implicitly recognize the right of innovators not to disclose.36 Further justi cation for trade secrecy can be found in the analysis of privacy law. While 
privacy law focuses on privacy as it pertains to individuals, the extension of privacy 
to commercial activities provides further arguments in favor of trade secrecy. Richard 
Posner addresses the relationship between privacy, which he de nes as “the withholding 
or concealment of information,”37 and secrecy, which is included in the broader de nition 
of privacy. Posner argues secrecy allows the innovator to choose when to disclose 
information. Posner argues privacy, and therefore secrecy, is sound in an economic sense in 
the commercial context because it reduces socially wasteful efforts to protect information.
The combination of labor, utilitarian, and privacy theories provides the main 
justi cations for Intellectual Property protection. These arguments are typically applied to 
the justi cation of patents, but similar arguments can be made in favor of trade secrecy. 
32.  Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justi cation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241 
(1998). Bone notes the Lockean argument cannot “explain two of the most basic features of trade secret law: its 
requirement of secrecy, and its concern with the way information is appropriated.” Id. at 284.
33.  Edwin Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1989). The labor mobility 
of employees can be hindered by non-compete or non-disclosure clauses in employment contracts that limit 
employee’s ability to work for other employers. This also falls under the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine.
34.  Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008).
35.  David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 61 (1991); Lemley, supra note 34.
36.  Lynn Sharp Paine, Trade Secrets and the Justi cation of Intellectual Property: A Comment on Hettinger, 20 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 247 (1991).
37.  RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 231 (1983).
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 Trade Secret Law Harmonization 
The international harmonization of trade secrecy laws is also an issue as differing 
legal approaches towards trade secrets pose problems for international business.38 
In contrast to patents, trade secrecy has relatively more heterogeneous protection 
internationally and may fall under a variety of legal jurisdictions (e.g., tort law, 
criminal law, and contract law).39 This lack of consistency obfuscates the legal 
protection of trade secrets, particularly for  rms operating in multiple countries. 
The public status of court proceedings can also have an impact on the protection of 
trade secrets, as  rms will be reluctant to seek legal recourse if court proceedings are 
made public.40 Furthermore, prior user rights are not internationally harmonized.41 
Given the discordance of international IP regimes, harmonization of trade secret laws 
internationally could prove bene cial to  rms operating internationally.
 The Property Liability Debate
This section introduces the property liability debate with respect to trade secrets and 
applies the analytical structure of optional law.42 As noted earlier, the legal protection 
of trade secrets prior to the EEA rested primarily in tort and contract law. As such, 
trade secrets are an entitlement protected by liability43 as opposed to other IP, such 
as patents, which are protected by property rules.44 The EEA, in the criminalization 
of theft of trade secrets, continues with the protection of trade secrets under liability 
rules. The economic ef ciency of the decision to protect entitlements through property 
or liability rules is an ongoing debate and merits discussion in its context with the EEA.
Calabresi and Melamed set up the property-liability rule.45 Consider the owner 
of a land and neighbor who wishes to pollute and damage the land. If the property 
entitlement lies with the owner, the neighbor can only pollute with the owner’s 
permission as the owner has the right to request a court injunction. If the property 
entitlement lies with the neighbor, the neighbor has the right to pollute. In these 
cases, the entitlement can result in an enjoinment of the nuisance (pollution) or 
does not recognize a nuisance. However, under the liability rules, the situation is 
38.  Bone, supra note 32; Lemley, supra note 34.
39.  Bone, supra note 32; Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).
40.  NASHERI, supra note 12.
41.  See Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
(Mitch Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
42.  Optional law takes real options analysis and applies it to law.
43.  Liability rules protect entitlements by compensating the entitlement holder in the event of a non-
consensual taking. IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005).
44.  Property rules protect the holder of the entitlement by deterring non-consensual takings. Id. 
45.  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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different. Assuming entitlement lies with the owner, the neighbor can pollute but must 
compensate the owner.46 In this case, the rules allow for damages47 and the nuisance to 
continue. 
Calabresi and Melamed argue entitlements promote economic ef ciency in that they 
minimize the administrative costs of enforcement, promote pareto optimality and can 
address society’s distributional goals. Furthermore, the authors argue liability rules are 
enacted when transactions costs are too high. This argument, as in Ayres, has become 
standard delineating theory of the decision to use property or liability rules.48 A similar 
argument, also in Ayres, is the “Posnerian theory” which argues that where transactions 
costs are not too high, property rules are favored as they “force” parties to negotiate.49 
When applied to IP, the use of property rights should reduce transactions costs. As 
Merges argues, “property rules can and do work effectively in many situations involving 
IPRs. This is so because, in the presence of high transaction costs, industry participants have 
an incentive to invest in institutions that lower the costs of IPR exchange.”50 This argument 
can justify the property protection of patents. However, Blair and Cotter argue trade secrets 
should have different protection than patents due to the unique characteristics of trade 
secrets including the lack of disclosure and the right of competitors’ to reverse engineer.51 
Furthermore, the application of the property–liability debate when applied to the 
EEA is not straightforward because the use of a property rule to protect trade secrets is 
problematic. The conversion of the trade secrecy entitlement into a property rule would 
imply the use of a trade secret could be enjoined. In practice, while the court could issue 
injunctions with respect to stolen trade secrets, the theft itself can destroy the secrecy of 
the trade secret itself. The value of the entitlement is destroyed by the theft. Furthermore, 
Blair and Cotter acknowledge “a trade secret owner’s rights are not valid against the 
world, but rather only against persons who have acquired the secret in certain ways or 
who stand in a con dential relationship to the owner.”52 Epstein concludes the case for 
the treatment of trade secrets as property from a legal perspective “remains a mess.”53 
46.  Calabresi and Melamed also discuss the case in which, under the liability rule, the entitlement lies with 
the neighbor, but note this is not common. Id. at 1120.
47.  Liability rules in criminal sanctions serve to approximate the value (damages) of the entitlement to its 
owner. Further discussion of criminal prosecution under the property law can be found in Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996).
48.  See AYRES, supra note 43, at 143.
49.  Id.
50.  Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 
(1994).
51.  Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability Rules and its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799 (2002).
52.  Id. at 811 n.31.
53.  Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets Under the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 57, 72 (2004).
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Hence, the theoretical application of property rules to the entitlement of trade secrets does 
not  t the Calabresi and Melamed de nition of property rules. Thus, the use of a variant of 
the liability under the EEA is in line with the unique characteristics of trade secrets, which, 
as discussed earlier, do not involve the public disclosure associated with patents.
  Options Analysis of the Law
Ayres applies the real options theory of economics to that of law to argue property rules 
are a special case of liability rules. Using the put/call framework of options theory, Ayres 
describes liability rules as a call option in which the entitlement is taken non-consensually 
and the owner is paid damages.54 He describes property rules as having a call option 
(damages) so high it deters non-consensual taking. In this sense, Ayres argues, “property 
rules are liability rules with an exercise price so high that the option is (almost) never 
taken.”55
Ayres notes the legal trend in the U.S. is the increasing “propertization of intellectual 
entitlements”56 in the form of IP. However, despite the trend to strengthening the property 
status of IP, the options theory framework of Ayres argues the property protection for IP is 
a variant of the liability rule. 
In his analysis of the debate between property and liability rules, he criticizes Calabresi 
and Melamed’s argument that liability rules are preferred when transactions costs are 
high. As Ayres argues, the transactions cost argument neglects to address the fact that 
bargaining can happen in the shadow of liability and property rules. Additionally, Ayres 
argues options theory can show liability rules can dominate property rules in economic 
ef ciency terms.
However, Ayres does not solve the liability versus property rules debate. As he notes, 
“The stark truth is that despite the empirical prevalence of property (and indeed the 
headlong rush toward the extreme propertization of intellectual property), no one has to 
date produced a satisfying algebraic model in which property rules dominate liability 
rules.”57 Thus, in the liability–property rule debate, the property status of other IP may 
raise more questions than it does answers. 
Overall, the examination of the property–liability rule debate in the context of the 
EEA further underscores the structural differences between trade secrets and patents and 
furthers the analysis of the criminal treatment of the theft of trade secrets. 
54.  This application of options theory is in line with Scotchmer’s observation of the circular relationship 
between damages and royalty rates in which the potential infringer can seek to negotiate royalty rates or 
exercise a call option in the form of infringement and the subsequent payment of damages. See SUZANNE 
SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2005).
55.  AYRES, supra note 43, at 5.
56.  Id. at 185.
57.  Id. at 199.
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 Law and Economics Analysis of Tort and Criminal Law
Further analysis of the decision to convert the theft of trade secrets into a felony can be 
found in the law and economics literature. Dnes notes criminalization of activity differs from 
civil action on three points: the standard of proof, mens rea (intent) and the element of public 
harm (i.e. the public is harmed by such actions).58 Furthermore, Dnes argues, “in tort, we 
tend to know when the accident or nuisance has occurred” while in criminal action, we may 
not. Thus, a prime role of the punishment in criminal cases is as a deterrent effect. This has 
important implications for the economic ef ciency of the criminalization of trade secrets.
When applied to the theft of trade secrets, many of Dnes’ elements of criminal law are 
met.59 Certainly, the standard of proof in EEA cases should be higher than parallel civil 
actions. However, the issue of intent may not be as straightforward. For this element to 
be met, the defendant would have to know that the trade secret they were stealing was, 
in fact, a protected trade secret. Furthermore, it may be, as in the case of DirecTV,60 the 
defendant intended to do harm but without a  nancial motive. Given the EEA is primarily 
concerned with the economic effects of trade secret theft, this lack of  nancial bene t 
raises concerns about the ef ciency of using criminal actions to prosecute a previously 
civil nuisance.
The element of public harm in EEA cases is indirect. As trade secrets are privately held 
information, then the individual cases of theft are, by de nition, private. However, the 
general deterrence effect of the EEA criminal sanctions should serve to bene t privately held 
information in general. If criminals are deterred by the EEA, then the owners of trade secrets 
can incur less wasteful avoidance expenditures to protect trade secrets. Thus, the public 
indirectly bene ts from a more secure IP environment. Dnes puts this succinctly: “suf cient 
penalties create deterrence, which removes the need for wasteful avoidance by potential 
victims.”61 In deterring the theft of trade secrets, a wasteful crime that bene ts the few, in 
that costs incurred by the many owners of trade secrets in the form of wasteful avoidance are 
reduced. Thus, the deterrence effects of the EEA increases economic ef ciency by decreasing 
the costs associated with protecting trade secrets. 
However, Dnes is critical of the use of criminal law to protect torts he deems that in some 
cases it is “staggeringly inappropriate.”62 He cites the example of the BBC license fee in the 
UK. The possession of a television without a license is subject to criminal sanctions in the 
form of  nes. In this case, Dnes concludes, “the state is using its coercive power simply to 
reduce the cost of pursuing those taking BBC services, offered to all, and subsequently failing 
58.  Anthony Dnes, Criminal Law and Torts, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009).
59.  Id.
60.  United States v. Serebryany, No. 2:03-cr-00042-LGB (C.D. Cal.,  led Jan. 16, 2003).
61.  Dnes, supra note 58, at 112 (citing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF TORT LAW (1987)).
62.  Id. at 120.
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to pay for them.”63 However, this example differs from the EEA in that, unlike the BBC 
monitoring of licenses, in which the BBC has a legal right to issue and monitor licenses,64 the 
reporting of EEA thefts is a voluntary action on the part of the victim. Nonetheless, both cases 
involve criminal sanctions to support the business models of corporations. 
Dnes further examines the delineation of criminal and tort law, and the use of criminal law 
in place of civil law, in a pollution example. In this case, the use of criminal law allows the 
coercive power of the state to “encourage desirable behavior.”65 In this case, under tort law, 
a polluter will prefer to pay  nes when the marginal cost of abatement of pollution is higher 
than that of the  ne. However, Dnes argues criminal  nes are equivalent to a strict-liability 
tort66 and  nes are paid on all pollution above the minimal level. As Dnes points out,  nes are 
always paid under the criminal law, whether or not the polluter abates. This, as Dnes argues, 
more ef ciently discourages pollution. 
An extension of this pollution example can be found in the EEA. The criminal prosecution 
of trade secrets could interact with the reverse engineering exception to trade secrecy. That 
is, the costs of reverse engineering could be considered abatement costs. Where reverse 
engineering is more expensive than  nes,  rms will choose to steal. In tort and contract 
law, the damages calculation ( ne) can function as a compulsory license.67 Under criminal 
action, theft is subject to  nes and/or incarceration. When reverse engineering is cheaper 
than  nes,  rms will reverse engineer. By increasing the punishment associated with theft, 
the EEA indirectly encourages reverse engineering. Samuelson and Scotchmer argue 
reverse engineering is important to innovation and competition and, thus, the EEA can be 
an important policy tool with respect to reverse engineering.68 Hence, the EEA promotes 
economic ef ciency by encouraging innovation, which is seen as a social bene t.
However, a normative conclusion on the decision to criminalize the theft of trade secrets 
is beyond the scope of this essay. While the EEA should improve economic ef ciency in the 
reduction of avoidance costs and the bene ts from innovation, the overall optimality of the 
criminalization of the theft of trade secrets is not certain. The analysis here suggest the EEA 
increases economic ef ciency by decreasing costs via improved deterrence and increasing 
63.  Id.
64.  For details, see TV Licensing—FOI: Legal framework, TVLICENSING.CO.UK, http://www.tvlicensing.co.uk/
about/foi-legal-framework-AB16/
65.  Dnes, supra note 58, at 121.
66.  Liability which is independent of culpability. 
67.  As Dan Burk notes, “Courts have in a very few instances denied injunctive relief to patent holders in favor 
of monetary damages, effectively creating a compulsory license for that patent, at a royalty determined by the 
court.” Dan L. Burk, Critical Analysis of Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Molecular Futures: Bargaining 
in the Shadow of the Cathedral, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT POOLS, 
CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1359216.
68.  Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 39. However, as Samuelson and Scotchmer point out, the legal status 
of reverse engineering under the EEA is unclear. See id.
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social bene ts by encouraging innovation. Further empirical investigations on the effects of 
the EEA should shed more light on this fact. Whether the EEA’s criminalization of the theft of 
trade secrets is entirely inappropriate remains to be seen. 
Empirical Analysis of the EEA 
To move from theoretical analysis to the empirical investigations of the EEA, we turn 
to the EEA prosecution data. During the period covered by this essay (1996-2008), there 
were 147 defendants in 95 cases involving the EEA. For this research, these cases have 
been identi ed using the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system. 
Once identi ed, each case was then investigated via docket reports, court documents, 
and online media coverage. Further information was gathered from academic essays 
related to the EEA.69 Depending on the court, of cial documents are only available from 
more recent cases; in some courts, the documents are only available for cases since 
2004. For a minority of cases, little to no information on the victim company and stolen 
information was available. The information gathered in this prosecution data represents 
a unique look into the use of trade secrets, their theft, and the policy choices available 
to governments.
 Data Challenges
The use of prosecution data faces a number of challenges and the EEA data are 
no exception. The primary obstacle is that of adverse selection. Prosecutors select 
cases based on the severity of the crime and the likelihood of successful prosecution. 
Prosecutors are also more likely to seek prosecution in cases where the evidence is 
strong and a conviction is likely as the burden of proof in criminal cases has a “tougher 
criterion than in one used in civil disputes.”70 Furthermore, victims must  rst report the 
alleged crime to the FBI via an of cial document reporting the offense.71 As Nasheri 
notes, “Probably the greatest reason why trade secret theft is not prosecuted more often is 
the failure of victim companies to report such thefts to government authorities.”72 
The cumulative effect of these challenges to the use of prosecution data is that 
conclusions arising from the data are tempered by the inherent sample bias. Despite 
this, it is important to remember that, given the nature of trade secrets, very little 
empirical data are available on their use. Economists have long used evidence from 
litigation to investigate the use of patents and their economic importance.73 The use of 
69.  Particularly Effron, supra note 10; Carr et al., supra note 4 ; Carr & Gorman, supra note 11; Marc J. 
Zwillinger & Christian S. Genetski, Calculating Loss Under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 323 (2000); NASHERI, supra note 12.
70.  Dnes, supra note 58; ANTHONY W. DNES, THE ECONOMICS OF LAW (1996); see also ROBERT COOTER & 
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (4th ed. 2004).
71.  Via their local FBI of ce, reporting form is “Checklist for Reporting Theft of Trade Secret Offense”, 
available from http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/reportingchecklist-ts.pdf
72.  NASHERI, supra note 12, at 52
73.  E.g., SCOTCHMER, supra note 54.
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patent litigation evidence can be found in Lanjouw and Schankerman,74 Schankerman and 
Scotchmer,75 and Jaffe and Lerner.76 As such, the EEA prosecution data are a legitimate means 
of analysis and offer a glimpse into the unseen world of trade secrets. The empirical analysis 
of EEA data developed throughout this essay furthers the understanding of the strategic use of 
trade secrets as a means of protecting innovation and builds on the similar existing litigation 
studies in patents. This essay joins Zwillinger and Genetski,77 Lerner78 and Almeling et al.79 in 
the use of court data to understand trade secrets.  
Composition of Defendants, Victims and Trade Secrets in EEA Cases
 Defendants
From its inception in 1996 through to 2008, 147 defendants were charged under the EEA. 
Given the economic espionage concerns that surrounded the birth of the EEA, the composition 
of the defendants themselves provides insight into the relevance of the drafters’ concerns. 
The data indicate the threat of theft is not external but predominately internal. As shown in 
the last row of Table 1, the EEA data demonstrate 76% of the defendants are insiders, 17% are 
outsiders and 7% have an unknown relationship. An “insider” is de ned as a current or former 
employee, which includes permanent and temporary employees and consultants or workers 
performing contracted-out work (for a third party company). In contrast, only 25 defendants 
were classi ed as outsiders, which include competitors, non-employees, or other roles that do 
not provide legitimate access. 
While the fact insiders are disproportionately responsible for theft in EEA cases should 
come as no surprise, as stated in Almeling et al.,80 it highlights the vulnerability trade secrets 
face when much of their protection is based on nondisclosure agreements. It also indicates 
some of the presumptions which led to the signing of the EEA, as in Carr et al. ,81 were 
concentrated misguidedly on outside threats, when the focus should have been on the internal 
threat to trade secrets. 
74.  See Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms 
Handicapped?, 47 J. Law & ECON. 45 (2004); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of 
Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129 (2001); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark 
Schankerman, The Quality of Ideas: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators, NATL. BURAEU ECON. 
RESEARCH, Working Paper No. 7345 (1999); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Stylized Facts of Patent 
Litigation: Value, Scope and Ownership, NATL. BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH, Working Paper No. 6297 (1997).
75.  Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Intellectual Property, 
32 RAND J. ECON. 199 (2001).
76.  JOSH LERNER & ADAM B. JAFFE, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS 
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
77.  Supra note 69.
78.  Supra note 7.
79.  David S. Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Saponznikow, Whitney E. McCollum & Jill Weader, A 
Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291 (2010).
80.  Id.
81.  See Carr et al., supra note 4.
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Table 1: Characteristics of EEA Defendants
Characteris? cs of Defendants*
Total Rela? onship to the Vic? m
Na? onality Count % Outsider % Insider % Unknown %
Foreign 32 22% 7 5% 25 17%
Na? onal** 115 78% 18 12% 86 59% 11 7%
Total 147 25 17% 111 76% 11 7%
   Source: EEA database on file with author.
* Reports on 136 of 147 defendants; insufficient information available for the missing 11   
       observations.
**If nationality unknown, defendant assumed to be U.S. national
The nationality of the defendants presents another test to the original presumptions 
of the EEA. As seen in the second column of Table 1, only 22% of the defendants 
were foreign nationals. Of the 32 foreigners charged with EEA violations, only one 
was convicted under § 1831 (Economic Espionage). Given the concern with economic 
espionage at the drafting of the EEA, these numbers suggest either economic 
espionage is less prevalent than trade secret theft, or its detection is more difficult.  
 Industrial Sectors of Victims
The EEA data also provide a look into the industries using trade secrets. The 
trade secret theft victim companies were classified by their Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code. In the majority (57%) of cases, the victim company 
operated in the manufacturing sectors. Of those in manufacturing, the largest groups 
include those in semiconductor manufacturing and manufacturers with software 
applications. The second largest sector is the service industry (17% of cases) and 
the remaining cases are scattered throughout other sectors. In line with Cohen et 
al. (2000),82 the predominance of the manufacturing sector in EEA cases suggests 
protection of trade secrets from theft is particularly important to this sector. 
Manufacturing has long had patents available as a robust form of protection.83 That 
the manufacturing sector, a sector that has both patent and copyright protection 
available, should be so active in trade secrets, emphasizes the importance of trade 
secrecy protection.  
82.  Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: 
Appropriability Condition and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), NATL. BUREAU OF ECON. 
RESEARCH, Working Paper No. 7552 (2000).
83.  Several studies examine the use of patents in manufacturing sectors, including Anthony Arundel & 
Isabelle Kabla, What Percentage of Innovations Are Patented? Empirical Estimates for European Firms, 27 
RESEARCH POLICY 127 (1998), and F.M. Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of 
Patented Inventions, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 1097 (1965).
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 Subject Matter of Stolen Trade Secrets
Trade secrecy protection has a large scope. It encompasses con dential information 
including source code; test data; strategic business information; and potentially patentable 
subject matters. In the EEA cases, as seen in Table 2 column 2, only 39% of the stolen 
trade secrets are deemed potentially patentable (meaning their subject matter is not 
excluded from patents; inventive step was not judged). 11% of stolen trade secrets had 
no descriptive information publicly available. 29% had only trade secrecy as a form of 
IP protection, which means this con dential information is particularly vulnerable and its 
theft particularly damaging. Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the characteristics of 
these stolen trade secrets. 
Table 2: EEA Trade Secrets
Characteris? cs of Stolen Trade Secrets: EEA Cases  From 1996-2008
Type Count %
Poten? ally patentable 38 39%
Not patentable 47 49%
Protected by other IP 19 20%
Not protected 28 29%
Uniden?  ed 9 11%
Total 95
Source: EEA database on  le with author.
It is important to emphasize these classi cations are based on limited information 
regarding the nature of the stolen trade secrets. Given the requirements for patent 
protection, Table 2 likely represents an overestimation of the trade secrets that are 
potentially patentable. That these trade secret owners chose not to use those alternate 
protections is proof further of the importance of trade secret protection for protecting 
innovations.
The Criminalization of the theft of Trade Secrets 
 The Impact on Victims
In EEA cases, all of the victims have been corporations and not individuals. The 
decision of these  rms to detect, investigate, report and proceed with criminal prosecution 
involves a different weighing of costs and bene ts than is necessary in civil cases. 
  Bene ts to the Victim Firm
From a resource perspective, a decision to seek a criminal prosecution involves a 
number of bene ts to the victim  rm. Unlike civil cases, the defendant in criminal cases 
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has a right to a speedy trial.84 As a result, the victim  rm potentially saves time and money 
avoiding a lengthy and resource-absorbing court case, as in Nasheri.85 Additionally, 
unlike civil cases, the cost of criminal prosecution is borne by the government and not the 
victim. 
Further bene ts of choosing criminal prosecution of trade secrets theft include the 
ability to prosecute judgment-proof defendants, a stronger sense of retribution and a 
potentially stronger enforcement message. As Carr et al. note,86 defendants without 
 nancial resources can commit trade secrecy theft, a civil suit resulting in damages can 
be a moot point as the judgment proof defendant is unable to pay. The criminal system 
avoids this with the option of incarceration as a form of punishment.87 Incarceration may 
have a stronger sense of retribution for trade secret victims as trade secret thieves are 
removed from the workplace and society at large.88 This incarceration also sends a strong 
enforcement message and decreases the expected bene ts of theft.
  Costs for the Victim Firm
Criminal prosecutions of defendants entail potential costs for the trade secret owner. 
A conspicuous resource cost associated with criminal prosecutions in EEA cases is 
lower  nancial damages awarded to the victim. However, a criminal action against the 
defendant does not preclude a parallel civil action. Victims can choose to seek both a 
criminal and a civil action89 and, thereby, mitigate the lower damages observed in criminal 
cases. 
Trade secret cases also run the risk of exposing the secret to the public gaze; however, 
the EEA does include con dentiality requirements.90 The trade secret becomes vulnerable 
to exposure during court cases, which, by de nition, will negate its secrecy, as discussed 
in Lowry.91 As Lerner notes,92 a cost to the victim of taking legal steps following the 
misappropriation of a trade secret is the potential for the loss of trade secrecy. Competitors 
may be able to glean strategic information from the court documents even if the trade 
84.  See, e.g., David Oblon, Gerald J. Mossinghoff & J. Derek Mason, The Economic Espionage Act: Federal 
Protection for Corporate Trade Secrets, OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. (March 
1999), http://www.oblon.com/publications/economic-espionage-act-federal-protection-corporate-trade-
secrets.
85.  See NASHERI, supra note 12.
86.  Supra note 4.
87.  E.g., Dnes, supra note 58.
88.  E.g., DNES, supra note 70.
89.  Two examples in which the victim enacted a parallel civil suit in addition to the criminal charges are United 
States v. Kern, No. 2:99-cr-00015-DFL-1 (E.D. Cal.,  led Jan. 21, 1999) , and United States v. Four Pillars, No. 
1:97-cr-00288-PCE-3 (N.D. Ohio,  led Oct. 1, 1997).
90.  18 U.S.C. § 1835 (“Orders to preserve con dentiality”).
91.  Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes: Dissolutions of Concurrent Property Interests, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 519 (1988).
92.  Lerner, supra note 7.
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secrets are not revealed. Inevitably, a court case will increase the number of Cozzi’s 
“hints,”93 and the availability of what Nasheri calls Competitive Intelligence,94 by 
increasing the number of public documents related to innovative activities.
From a relationship perspective, the cost of choosing a criminal prosecution includes 
reputational and control costs. As with civil cases, the revelation a company has been 
the victim of a trade secrets theft can damage its reputation. The market may view the 
theft as evidence of lax security standards or future potential liability, as evidenced in 
Carr and Gorman.95 Nasheri reports on a survey where nearly one half of respondents 
would not report a theft to anyone outside the company.96 However, criminal charges 
are likely to have particularly adverse effects on a  rm’s relationship and reputation 
with its employees. As the EEA data demonstrate, the majority of defendants are 
insiders and employees may object to the criminal prosecution of one of their 
colleagues. Increased distrust can change company culture and lower social capital 
within a  rm. Indeed, one critique of the functional consequences of the EEA is that it 
unfairly restricts labor mobility, as in Nasheri.97
In addition, criminal prosecution requires the  rm relinquish control over the 
action to the government.98 While victims cooperate with the authorities, the FBI is 
in charge of the investigation and federal prosecutors will make important decisions 
related to the case. This loss of control presents a risk not found in civil cases where 
the plaintiff has signi cant control over the course of the case. Hence, the decision to 
seek criminal action involves a number of  nancial and other costs not associated with 
civil actions.99 At the same time, the bene ts may make a criminal action worthwhile. 
The  rms in the EEA cases, by de nition, weighed these costs and bene ts ex-ante and 
proceeded with reporting the crime. 
 Criminalization and Detection
In order to have an accurate picture of the evidence found in the EEA prosecutions, 
it is essential to examine the external effects created by the advent of criminal 
prosecutions of trade secrecy theft. The EEA offers  rms a means of seeking criminal, 
in addition to the existing civil, action against trade secret thefts. It also affects the 
behavior of employees and increases the potential punishment associated with theft.  
93.  Guido Cozzi, “Inventing or Spying” Implications for Growth, 6 J. ECON. GROWTH 55 (2001), describes 
the “hints” associated with innovative activity that alert would-be spies to the existence of such activity.
94.  Nasheri de nes Competitive Intelligence as “a systematic and ethical program for gathering, analyzing 
and managing information that can affect a company’s plans, decisions and operations.” NASHERI, supra note 
12, at 73.
95.  Carr & Gorman, supra note 11.
96.  NASHERI, supra note 12, at 59.
97.  NASHERI, supra note 12.
98.  Carr & Gorman, supra note 11; see also Oblon et al., supra note 84.
99.  Carr & Gorman, supra note 11.
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  Comparison to Civil Actions
Lerner investigates trade secret litigation for insights into trade secrets and compares 
this data to similar data on patent litigation.100 He notes, “In those cases where the damages 
were determined, they averaged $1.5 million in 2004 dollars. This is less than one-third 
the mean level of damages in the patent cases examined by Moore [2000].”101 In the 
EEA cases, which do not exclude the possibility of parallel civil cases, defendants are 
subject to  nes, forfeitures and restitution. The victim can bene t from restitution but 
does not necessarily receive the bene ts of  nes and forfeitures. The median restitution 
was $193,043, which is just over one tenth of the damages in Lerner’s cases. The average 
restitution of $1.5 million resembles Lerner’s average more closely but has an upward bias 
due to a number of high awards as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: EEA Fines, Forfeitures and Restitutions
EEA Fines, Forfeitures and Res? tu? ons, 1996-2008
Fine Forfeiture Res? tu? on
# of defendants (%) 35 (24%) 1 (1%) 32 (22%)
63 (43%) defendants were subject to  ne, forfeiture and/or res? tu? on
Mean $74,000 $60,000 $1,474,000
Standard Devia? on $338,000 - $2,564,000
Minimum $500 $60,000 $500
Maximum $2,000,000 $60,000 $7,655,155
 Source: EEA database on  le with author.
An obvious difference from civil cases is the incarceration penalties associated with 
criminal cases, which are absent in civil cases. The EEA data have a conviction rate of 
69% on at least one count (includes plea bargains). This compares to an estimated 90% 
conviction rate in federal court102 of all federal cases that go to trial. In EEA cases, as in 
Table 4, 61% of all defendants were sentenced to some form of incarceration, house arrest, 
100.  Lerner, supra note 7.
101.  Id. at 13 (citing Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the 
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000)).
102.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, at II-18 (2012) (reporting 93% of 
criminal cases as “favorably resolved”), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2011/section2.pdf.
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probation or supervised release. 61% of defendants were sentenced to probation, which 
averaged 33 months. Only 37% of defendants were incarcerated for an average of 22 
months. However, as the conviction rate of EEA cases is 69%, this data indicate 88% of 
those convicted in EEA cases receive some form of incarceration, house arrest, supervised 
release or probation. When removing the  ve defendants classi ed as corporations, 
virtually all individuals convicted in EEA cases receive incarceration and/or probation 
sentences. 
Table 4: EEA Incarceration and Probation
EEA Incarcera? on and Proba? on, 1996-2008
 Incarcera? on and 
House Arrest
Proba? on and Supervised Release
# of defendants (%) 55 (37%) 89 (61%)
90 (61%) defendants were subject to some form of incarcera? on and proba? on
Mean (in months) 22 33
Standard Devia? on 21.5 14.0
Minimum 2 6
Maximum 96 60
Source: EEA database on  le with author.
Further work remains to be done on the empirical comparison of EEA criminal cases 
to trade secret civil cases. This work should provide insight into the policy differences 
between criminal and civil cases, the effects of the escalation of trade secrets to a felony 
and the in uence on  rms’ behavior.
This section presented an empirical analysis of EEA prosecutions. The data challenges 
assumptions made in the drafting the EEA including the evidence that insiders and U.S. 
nationals are responsible for most alleged thefts. Furthermore, the data suggests the 
manufacturing sectors are particularly dependent on trade secrets and many of the secrets 
in question were reliant on trade secrecy. Finally, the data illustrates some differences 
between civil and criminal approaches to trade secrecy theft. 
Conclusion
The EEA marked a change in the U.S. approach to trade secret theft and the threat of 
economic espionage. It also offered researchers an unprecedented opportunity to gain 
insight into the use of trade secrets by US  rms, the composition of victims, the content 
of trade secrets and the composition and motivation of defendants. While the data have 
some disadvantages, it provides a hitherto unavailable insight into the world of trade 
secrets. 
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The data collected for this essay, 147 defendants in 95 cases of the EEA since its 
inception in 1996 until 2008, demonstrate that some of the original concerns of the drafters 
of the EEA were misguided. Insiders present the largest threat to trade secrets and are 
responsible for the vast majority of thefts. Non-nationals, the group whom the drafters 
of the EEA initially regarded as suspects, emerge as less of a concern, or at least a less 
detected problem than originally anticipated. The industry reporting the most thefts is the 
manufacturing sector, which suggests trade secrets are of particular strategic importance 
to these  rms and their enforcement is a priority. Finally, the nature of the trade secrets in 
EEA cases reveals a mere 39% of them could be patented. Even with this liberal estimate, 
the choice of trade secrecy by  rms indicates the  rms view trade secrets as an important 
strategic IP tool and these secrets are particularly vulnerable to outright theft or other forms 
of misappropriation.
The ef ciency of criminalization of the theft of trade secrets remains to be tested. As 
Dnes notes, the use of criminal law for tort-like actions can be appropriate. He notes 
that, “Broadly, the emphasis is on the nature of criminal intent, and the manner in which 
widespread impacts may have very high values attached to them.”103 As more cases are 
prosecuted under the EEA, a clearer picture of the use of criminal law in place of tort or 
contract law with respect to trade secrets should emerge. 
103.   Dnes, supra note 58, at 123.
